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Escaping the Allure of Joint Employment; Using Fault-Based Principles to Impose
Liability for the Denial of Employee Statutory Rights
Michael C. Harper

Using joint employment alone to impose liability requires an extension of
the strict imputed liability theory embodied in respondeat superior. Employers,
including incorporated businesses, under the common law are strictly liable for
harms to their employees, as they are for harm to third parties, because of actions
of their agents or other employees taken within the scope of their employment.
The liability is strict because it does not depend on a finding that the employer, the
principle, was negligent or otherwise at fault. Expanding liability through joint
employment, even if based on a demonstration of joint control of statutorily
protected employees, extends this strict imputed liability by imposing
responsibility on one of the businesses for the acts of managers or others who may
not be under its control.
There are both a practical political problem and a related legal doctrinal
problem with using joint employment to draw the boundaries of assigned liability
for the denial of employee statutory rights. The legal doctrinal problem is that the
common law definition of employment is too constricted to reach all actions of
agents of independent businesses that sometimes cause the denial of statutory
employee rights. Before treating a business as an employer on whom strict
respondeat superior liability can be imposed, the common law has required that a
business have sufficient control over workers to ensure that their work is aligned
with its interests. Yet employers may intentionally or negligently cause the denial
of employee rights without having such control. Franchisors, for instance, that do
not meet the common law definition of employer for their franchisees’ employees,
typically do have enough influence over their franchisees to cause violations of
federal or state wage and hour laws or the National Labor Relations Act.
The practical political problem is that expanding joint employment liability
from its common law dimensions to reach businesses that may have not caused
the denial of employee statutory rights seems unfair to business owners and
managers, in part because it is disruptive of efficient business relationships. The
imposition of strict liability on one employer for a second employer’s denial of
1
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rights to its employees may compel the first employer to assert full control over
the second employer’s employment relations. Whether or not this benefits the
employees, it may also disrupt efficient relationships that have been set
contractually between two solvent businesses for reasons other than the evasion
of liability through insolvency. Not surprisingly, not only the business community,
but also the judiciary has resisted imposing liability on employers whose agents
have not been the cause of statutory harm.
An alternative fault-based approach to extending liability for the
deprivation of statutory rights can reach more culpable businesses, whether or not
joint employers, without the disruption of efficient business relationships. Many
statutes, including Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the National Labor
Relations Act, have been reasonably read to embody this fault-based approach,
and those that cannot, including the Fair Labor Standards Act, can be read to
permit non-preempted supplementary common law actions based on implied
duties not to interfere actively with another employer’s grant of statutory
benefits. This fault-based approach would allow businesses to determine the
efficient level of control they exert over the employment policies of subordinate
independent businesses, but require them to take reasonable steps to ensure that
whatever control they do exert does not result in the deprivation of the rights of
the employees of the subordinate businesses.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade the debate over which businesses should be assigned
liability for the denial of employee statutory rights has focused almost exclusively
on the doctrine of joint employment. Progressive government1 and academic
lawyers2 have advocated the use of joint employment doctrine to expand the
number of employees whose employment rights economically dominant
franchisors and users of supplied or subcontracted labor are responsible for
1

See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor Wage & Hour Div., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2016-1, Joint Employment
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Migrant and Season Agricultural Worker Protection Act 5, 13 (2016);
Browning-Ferris Industries of California, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015) (defining joint employment under the National
Labor Relations Act).
2
See, e.g., Andrew Elmore & Kati Griffith, Franchisor Employer as Employment Control,109 Calif. L. Rev. xxx (2021)
(forthcoming); Guy Davidov, Joint Employer Status in Triangular Employment Relationships, 42 B RIT . J. INDUS. REL.
727, 739 (2004).

2
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protecting. This essay contends that this focus on joint employment as the
primary doctrinal tool for expanding employer responsibility for the denial of
employee rights has been misguided. Rather than relying primarily on joint
employment doctrine and the associated strict imputed liability theory of
respondeat superior, progressive lawyers should press for a more robust
application of fault-based principles drawn from the common law of torts.3 This
shift of focus need not weaken the case for an expansion of collective bargaining
responsibilities. In order to enable collective bargaining to more fully serve its
redistributive goals, progressives should seek a legislative amendment that
assigns bargaining responsibility to the providers of capital, rather than only to
joint employers who would have imputed respondeat superior liability for torts
against third parties.4
Joint employment doctrine may seem to offer the most promising route to
making economically dominant businesses responsible for the denial of employee
rights. If a franchisor or economically dominant contractor is a joint employer of
employees of workers formally employed by another employer, the franchisor or
contractor theoretically can be assigned liability for any denial of the rights of
employees, even when that denial is the fault of only the primary formal
employer. Such strict liability seems to follow, at least for rights secured under
statutes whose definition of employment is to derive from the common law, 5
because the common law derived the definition of the employment relationship
to set the boundaries of strict imputed, respondeat superior employer liability.6
Though the definition of employment was used primarily in the common law to
set the bounds of strict imputed employer liability to third parties for employee
3

See infra TAN 55-70; 81-88.
See infra TAN 162-170.
5
The Supreme Court has made clear that the common law provides a default definition for the employment
relationship for the many federal statutes -- including the anti-discrimination statutes and the National Labor
Relations Act -- that do not provide a meaningful alternative definition. See, e.g., Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). The Court
acknowledges, however, that by defining “employ” to mean “suffer or permit to work,” the Fair Labor Standards
Act does provide an alternative and more inclusive definition based on older child labor statutes. See Darden,
supra, at xxx.
6
See M ARC LINDER, THE E MPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-A MERICAN LAW , A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 133-150
(1989); Michael C. Harper, Using the Anglo-American Respondeat Superior Principle to Assign Responsibility for
Worker Statutory Benefits and Protections, Wash. Univ. Global Stud. L, Rev. 161, 177-78 (2019); Richard R. Carlson,
Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 B ERKELEY. J. OF E MP .
& LAB. L. 295, xxx (2001).
4

3
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torts committed in the scope of employment, the same arguments for employer
internalization of the costs of doing business can be used to support strict
employer liability for the denials of employee rights during the course of
business.7
Yet the common law definition of employment is too constricted to reach
all businesses that sometimes cause the denial of statutory employee rights.
Before treating a business as an employer on whom strict respondeat liability can
be imposed, the common law has required that a business have sufficient control
over workers to ensure their work is aligned with its interests.8 Economically
dominant franchisors or contractor employers may intentionally or negligently
cause the denial of franchisee-employee rights without having such control. A
food franchisor, for instance, that cedes control over the hiring, discipline, work
direction, and compensation of a franchisee’s workers, may not meet the
common law definition of employer for these workers. Indeed, by taking its
royalties as a share only of revenues rather than of net profits,9 a typical fast food
franchisor provides its franchisees with an incentive to not fully align personnel
policies with the interests of their franchisor.10 Nonetheless, franchisors that
control franchisees’ right to continue and expand their branded operations
typically will have enough influence over their franchisees to cause particular
violations of federal or state wage and hour laws or the National Labor Relations
Act.11

7

See Harper, supra note 6, at 178-184.
See id. at 179-181. Following the Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 220(2), published in 1958, contemporary
articulations of what is summarized as a right to control test invoke multiple factors, including those offered by the
Court in Reid and then quoted in Darden, that are relevant to the existence vel non of an employment relationship.
See, e.g., Darden, 503 U.S. at 323, quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 750-51. As stated in the Restatement of Employment
Law (2015) (hereinafter REL) § 1.01, the multifactor tests determine whether a worker renders service in alignment
with the putative employer’s interest or rather somewhat in his or her own or another independent business’s
interest. See also REL § 1.04.
9
See ROGER D. BLAIR & F RANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE E CONOMICS OF FRANCHISING (2005); G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A.
Winter, The Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J. OF LAW AND E CON. 503 (1985); Gillian K. Hadfield,
Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 S TAN. L. REV. 927, 933 (1990)
10
The franchisee of course has a greater incentive to reduce labor costs, even if somewhat at the risk of reduced
sales, while the franchisor is relatively more interested in expanding sales, even if somewhat at the expense of the
franchisee’s profits.
11
See, e.g., Ochoa v. McDonald’s Corp., 133 F. Supp.3d 1228, 1236 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (testimony of John A. Gordon,
restaurant advisor and consultant: “’McDonald’s is able to exercise a greater degree of control over its franchisees’
restaurants’ … through control over growth and rewrite, and the ability to terminate franchise agreements for
8

4
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Addressing this under inclusion by expanding joint employment from its
common law dimensions to impose strict liability without fault on any business
with sufficient economic power to control the personnel delinquencies of other
businesses, however, may seem unfair and disruptive of efficient business
relationships. It may seem unfair to many to impose strict liability on a business
that has not affirmatively caused another independent business’s denial of
employee statutory rights. The imposition of strict liability also may cause an
economically independent business without direct culpability to attempt to assert
full control over any economically culpable business’s employment relations.
Whether or not this forced vertical integration of business operations benefits the
employees, it may also disrupt efficient relationships that have been set
contractually between independent solvent businesses12 for reasons other than
the evasion of liability through insolvency.13 More conservative policy makers,14

deviation from its standards.”). See also the compelling case for franchisor influence over franchisees presented in
Elmore & Griffith, supra note 2.
12
Reductions of labor costs set by internal labor markets seem to be one reason for divisions of operations
between firms, through subcontracting, franchising, and other forms of vertical disintegration. See DAVID WEIL, THE
FISSURED WORKPLACE : WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 49-52 (Harvard
Univ. Press 2014); Hugh Collins, Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to
Employment Protection Laws, 10 O XFORD J. OF LEG. STUD. 353, 354 (1990). However, firms also derive efficiencies by
assigning tasks to more specialized firms with “core competencies.” See Weil, at 85-88; Collins, at 360; Davidov,
supra note 2, at 730-31.
13
Ensuring compensation to employees who have been denied statutory rights of course provides the strongest
policy arguments for extending liability to firms other than the employers primarily responsible for the denial of
the rights. These arguments apply where there is risk that the primarily responsible employers are unable to
provide compensation because of insolvency. In most other cases the extension of liability to other businesses
with some contractual relationship with the responsible business will have no effect on ensuring compensation or
on the firm that pays. Contracts between two rationally operated businesses will almost invariably include
indemnity clauses. See Kati L. Griffith, An Empirical Study of Fast-food Franchising Contracts: Towards A New
Intermediary Theory of Joint Employment, 94 Wash. L. Rev. 172, xxx (2019) (finding indemnity clauses to be
common in franchise agreements).
Assigning responsibility for purposes of defining collective bargaining obligations, however, might matter
significantly even where each business is fully solvent. See infra TAN 162-170.
14
See Save Local Business Act H.R. 3441, 115 th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug., 2017) (legislation to amend National Labor
Relations Act and Fair Labor Standards Act to tighten definition of joint employment); Protecting Local Business
Opportunity Act H.R. 3459 (Sept. 2015) (legislation to amend National Labor Relations Act to tighten definition of
joint employment); Joint Employer Status under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 11184 (2020)
(President Trump-appointed Labor Board Rule tightening President Obama-appoint Labor Board definition of joint
employment); Joint Employer Status under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 2820 (2020) (Department of
Labor tightening of joint employer definition).

5
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the business community,15 and courts applying liability rules16 thus predictably
have resisted the expansion of joint employment and its associated strict liability.
Furthermore, no realistic expansion of joint employment doctrine can reach
all businesses that are responsible for the denial of rights that employment
statutes are intended to secure. Even in the absence of any continuing
relationship on which a claim of joint employment could be based, a business may
impair the statutory rights of the employees of other businesses through the
exertion of economic leverage.17 This seems particularly likely for businesses with
market-based leverage over other independent businesses.
In light of these difficulties with the use of joint employment doctrine, this
essay demonstrates how fault-based principles borrowed from tort law can be
better used to define the employers responsible for the denial of employee rights.
By analyzing cases and hypotheticals under three types of statutory regimes, the
essay contends that these principles should supplement the strict liability, joint
employment doctrine. The fault-based principles explain how and when
employers can and should be liable for some denials of statutory rights to workers
over whom they may not exercise the kind of authority that would justify the
imposition of joint employer status and its associated strict liability.18 The essay
also contends that the case for expanding the scope of liability through the
application of fault-based principles has more appeal than does expanding the
scope of liability by enlarging the concept of joint employment from its roots in
the law of respondeat superior.19
The essay first considers how fault-based principles can impose liability on
non-joint employers for the discrimination and retaliation prohibited by Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,20 and other anti-discrimination statutes like the Age
15

See, e.g., Testimony of Tamra Kennedy, Testifying on Behalf of International Franchise Association, in favor of
H.R. 3441, supra note 14; Testimony of G. Roger King, Senior Labor and Employment Counsel, H.R. Policy
Association, for the House Education and Workforce Committee Hearing on Joint Employer Policy and Legal Issues,
July 12, 2017; Testimony of Kevin R. Cole, on Behalf of Independent Electrical Contractors in favor of H.R. 3459,
supra note 14, Sept. 29, 2015; Letter from National Federation of Independent Business, in favor of H.R. 3459,
supra note 14, Sept. 10, 2015
16
See, e.g., infra TAN and note 71; infra TAN and note 151.
17
See, e.g., infra TAN and notes 39-52; infra TAN and notes 134-142.
18
See, e.g., id.
19
See, e.g., infra TAN 67-72; infra TAN 107-120; infra TAN 143-150.
20
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2017).

6
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)21 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA).22 The common law provides an alternative model to that of joint
employment for the imposition of this liability. This alternative is the tort of
intentional wrongful interference with a present or potential employment
relationship between two other parties.23 As some judicial decisions have
recognized,24 the language of the anti-discrimination statutes allow this model to
be applied as a statutory cause of action against employers that obstruct with
prohibited intent other employers from hiring particular employees. Furthermore,
the statutes should permit the interference tort to be used against employers
who intentionally cause other employers to discriminate or retaliate in violation
of one of these statutes.25 The essay also explains how fault-based principles can
be adapted to impose non-economic liability outside joint employment for
discriminatory harassment.26
The essay next considers the expansion of responsibility for the denial of
the minimum wage and overtime payment obligations imposed by the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA),27 as well as many state statutes.28 The tort of intentional
wrongful interference with employment or prospective employment would be of
limited use in expanding liability beyond the single or joint employers assigned
such obligations; few employers have the intention of preventing other
employers from meeting their FLSA responsibilities. However, negligence law
does provide a fault-based model for expanding FLSA liability.29 Employers whose
continuing control of other employers and their employees is insufficient to be
treated as joint employers nonetheless may cause the denial of FLSA rights
through particular affirmative acts of negligent interactions with other employers.
When causation can be demonstrated, affirmative negligent acts, if not also

21

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2017).
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2017).
23
See infra TAN 55-67.
24
See infra TAN 39-55.
25
See infra TAN 56-72.
26
See infra TAN 73-88.
27
29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
28
The FLSA does not preempt state minimum wage or wage payment laws. All but five states impose their own
minimum wage, a majority at a level above that set in the FLSA. See https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/mwconsolidated.
29
See infra TAN 91-94.
22

7
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passive acquiescence to known wage and hour violations, make a compelling case
for liability, regardless of joint employment status. 30
The essay acknowledges that using a negligence model to expand FLSA
liability would require legislative action. Unlike the tort of intentional wrongful
interference for the anti-discrimination laws, a negligence tort cannot be easily
spliced on to the language of the FLSA. Furthermore, common law courts have
not required employers to exercise reasonable care when affecting employees of
other employers.31
The essay finally considers the administrative law regime of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).32 The NLRA renders illegal an employer’s interference
with or restraint or coercion of employees’ concerted activity for their mutual
aid,33 as well as an employer’s discrimination to encourage or discourage union
membership or activity.34 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the agency
delegated exclusive power to enforce the NLRA, has interpreted these
prohibitions to apply against employers for actions that directly and intentionally
affect the employees of other employers.35
The essay considers that the NLRA also requires employers to bargain with
unions that demonstrate support from a majority of employees in a unit
appropriate for bargaining,36 and it allows that fault-based liability rules do not
help define the employers that may be subject to such bargaining obligations. 37
However, the essay concludes that expanding the meaning of joint employment
also is not the best way to define the economic relationship most appropriate for
collective bargaining. 38

30

See infra TAN 121-126.
See infra TAN 103.
32
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188.
33
29 U.SC. § 148(a)(1).
34
29 U.S.C. § 148(a)(3).
35
See infra TAN 134-142.
36
29 U.S.C. §§ 148(a)(5); 149(a).
37
See infra TAN 155-163.
38
See infra TAN 164-169.
31

8
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II.

Intentional Interference with Non-Discriminatory Employment

Within the first decade after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, without
any reference to joint employment, a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals explained in Sibley v. Memorial Hospital39 how Title VII’s
prohibition of intentional discrimination40 applied against employers that had
intentionally caused prohibited discrimination against employees of other
employers. Sibley was a private duty nurse who claimed that supervisors at a
private hospital had refused because of his male gender to refer him for
employment with two female patients in rooms at the hospital. The parties did
not contest that the hospital had sufficient employees to fit Title VII’s definition of
employer,41 nor did they dispute that Sibley was not one of those employees.
Furthermore, Sibley did not, and could not persuasively, contend that the hospital
met Title VII’s definition of an employment agency also subject to antidiscrimination prohibitions.42 The issue before the panel was only whether Title
VII’s prohibition of intentional discrimination reached an employer’s obstruction
of an individual’s potential employment relationships with third parties such as
the two female patients.43 Judge McGowan, writing for a unanimous panel,
stressed that the prohibition of intentional employment discrimination covers an
employer’s discrimination against “any individual with respect to . . . privileges of
employment” rather than only against present or former employees or applicants
for employment.44 He also emphasized that Title VII’s objective of achieving
39

488 F.2d 1338 (1973).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
41
Title VII offers as its definition of employer only: “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year … “ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
42
Sibley in any case would not have been able to include the hospital within this definition, which “means any
person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer or to procure
for employees opportunities to work for an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c).
43
The parties also did not contest the Court of Appeals’ assumption that Sibley, if referred by the hospital, could
have been in employment relationships with the patients. Later Courts of Appeals have declined to apply Sibley
under similar facts because they have found plaintiffs failed to establish that obstructed patient relationships were
ones of employment and thus within the scope of Title VII. See, e.g., Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 514
F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008); Bender v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 159 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 1998); Diggs v. Harris Hosp.Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1988).
44
488 F.2d at 1341.
40

9
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“equality of employment opportunities”45 could be circumvented if the statute
did not constrain discrimination by businesses, like the defendant hospital, that
were in control of the employment opportunities of individuals other than their
employees. “To permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances peculiarly
affording it the capability of discriminatorily interfering with an individual’s
employment opportunities with another employer, while it could not do so with
respect to employment in its own service, would be to condone continued use of
the very criteria for employment that Congress has prohibited.”46
Although the Sibley court’s liberal interpretation of the relevant statutory
language has not been accepted in all other Courts of Appeals,47 no court has
contested the policy argument for expanding Title VII’s coverage of intentional
employment discrimination by influential third party employers like the hospital. 48
Most adherents to non-discrimination principles would agree that the hospital’s
discrimination, if proven, at least should be illegal and that this illegality should
not turn on whether the hospital also employed Sibley. If the hospital is an
employer covered by the Act,49 if it intentionally discriminated with what would
be employment relationships between Sibley and the patients, the hospital
should be held responsible.50 The same coverage of third party interference
should apply for the age discrimination in employment prohibited by similar
language in the ADEA, for the disability discrimination in employment prohibited

45

Id. 1340-41 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1969).
Id. at 1341. Title VII defines “employer” to mean “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
47
See, e.g., Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2009) (rejecting “interference theory” and using only
common law of agency in disparate impact challenge to state test used by local police departments); Gulino v. New
York State Educ. Dept., 460 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2006) (refusing to apply Sibley in disparate impact challenge to a state
test given to local school department employees).
48
For other decisions applying the Sibley interference theory, see, e.g., Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators v.
California, 231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2000) (disparate impact case against state for teacher credentialing test);
Christopher v. Stouder Mem’l Hosp., 936 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1991) (hospital’s retaliation against scrub nurse by
limiting private duty and thus employment opportunities). See generally Andrew O. Schiff, The Liability of Third
Parties under Title VII, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. (1984).
49
See supra note 46.
50
Other courts have found Sibley inapplicable to cases where the relationships were not ones of employment. See,
e.g., Bender v. Suburban Hosp., Inc. 159 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 1998) (doctor’s obstructed relationship with patients not
one of employment); Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (same); Darks v.
Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1984) (city that does not license dance hall is not interfering with employment
relationship).
46

10
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by the more capacious language in Title I of the ADA,51 and for the retaliation
prohibited by provisions in all these statutes.52 It should apply under § 198153 for
any obstruction of contractual opportunities, whether or not employment
related,54 and it should apply under state anti-discrimination laws that have
sufficiently broad language. The political case for such application, whether by
judicial interpretation or by legislative amendment, is much easier to advance
than is any case for imposing strict liability on the hospital as a joint employer for
any discriminatory acts of another employer of which its agents did not even have
knowledge.
The common law tort of intentional wrongful interference with contractual
or prospective economic relations55 provides not only a model for the coverage of
third party interference under the anti-discrimination statutes, but also an
alternative to joint employment as a way to enforce statutory anti-discrimination
and anti-retaliation policies against third party interference. Title VII and the
other federal anti-discrimination statutes do not have a strong preemptive
force.56 The federal laws anticipate the involvement of state law in the eradication
of discrimination and allow state laws to strengthen federal law as long as they do
not prohibit what federal law requires.57 Because federal anti-discrimination law
has not been framed to occupy the field of discrimination regulation, it would be
fully appropriate for state courts to apply and develop the wrongful interference
tort as a fault-based tool against employment discrimination.
51

See Satterfield v. Tennessee, 295 F.3d 611 (6th Cir. 2002) (Sibley could apply to disability discrimination case if
interference with employment relationship); Carpart Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of
New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) (Sibley analysis the same under ADA and Title VII).
52
See Christopher v. Stouder Mem’l Hosp, supra note 48.
53
“All persons … shall have the same right … to make and enforce contracts … as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42
U.S.C. § 1981.
54
See Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 842 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Sibley is equally applicable to a claim under §
1981” against a hospital for discriminatory recommendation causing discharge from residency program of another
hospital).
55
Most jurisdictions, as well as the Restatements Second and Third of Torts, separate the interference tort into
two torts, one covering interference with contract and the other covering interference with prospective
contractual relations or economic expectations. See Restatement Second Torts §§ 766 and 766B; Restatement
Third Torts: Liability for Economic Harm §§ 17 and 18. The Restatement of Employment Law (REL) § 603, however,
follows the many jurisdictions that treat intentional interference as one tort.
56
See California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282-83 (1987) (“narrow scope of
preemption … reflects the importance Congress attached to state anti-discrimination laws in achieving Title VII’s
goal of equal employment opportunity”).
57
See id.

11
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The tort fits well third party intentional discrimination that causes a
contractual employment relationship to be terminated or to not be formed. The
elements of the tort include: (1) a contractual or prospective economic
relationship between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s
awareness of the relationship; (3) the defendant’s action with an intent to
interfere with the relationship; (4) the defendant’s action causing the
interference; (5) the interference resulting in foreseeable economic damages to
the plaintiff; and (6) the defendant’s action being “improper.”58 These elements
can be satisfied in a case like Sibley where a business with discriminatory intent
interferes with the employment or employment prospects of a worker with
another employer or prospective employer.
The most problematic element of the interference tort for application to
cases like Sibley may be the requirement that the action be “improper.” However,
actions taken with a discriminatory intent condemned by federal antidiscrimination law should fit this requirement regardless of whether it is
interpreted in accord with the Restatements Second or Third of Torts or the
Restatement of Employment Law. Each of these Restatements take somewhat
different approaches to defining what is “improper.” The Restatement Second of
Torts articulated a seven-factor balancing test that considered the nature of the
defendant’s conduct, the defendant’s motive, the interests of the plaintiff, the
interests of the defendant, societal interests, the proximity of the conduct to the
interference, and the relations between the defendant and the plaintiff. 59 It
seems improbable that any such balancing would not condemn a discriminatory
interference like that in Sibley.
Satisfying the approach of the Restatement of Employment Law also should
be possible. This Restatement found that most employment cases, rather than
follow the multifactor approach, instead focused on whether the interference was
privileged or justified by a legitimate business interest and was accomplished
without using some means “defined by common or statutory law as wrongful.” 60
Whether or not federal anti-discrimination laws provide a cause of action against
employers that interfere with a discriminatory intent in the employment or
58

See REL § 6.03, cmt. b.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 767.
60
See REL § 6.03, cmt. b.
59
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prospective employment relationships of other employers, these statues do
unequivocally define certain discriminatory intent as improper against public
policy.
The Restatement Third of Torts, also rejecting the multifactor balancing test
offered by the Restatement Second, conditions the interference tort on the
defendant committing “an independent and intentional legal wrong.”61 The
Restatement Third comments that “independent” means that the conduct “was
wrongful apart from its effect on the plaintiff’s contract”62 or “in some way
recognized elsewhere by the law.”63 The Restatement Third does not, however,
require that the wrongful conduct could support a separate cause of action
independent of the interference tort. It is not a significant reach to cover as
independently wrongful discriminatory intent condemned by federal statutes. If
most jurisdictions can recognize a common law cause of action for discharge in
violation of a public policy expressed in federal and state statutes, 64 so should
they be able to recognize an interference tort based on a public policy against
wrongful discrimination based in such statutes. Furthermore, the Restatement
Third’s expressed reasons for requiring independence, the protection of
competitive business practices65 and the difficulty in determining the existence of
malice,66 do not apply to the protection of discriminatory intent.
Even if the fault-based interference tort requires further judicial or
legislative development, it provides a more effective model for expanding liability
for employment discrimination than does the modification of joint employment
doctrine. To illustrate the comparative potential of the two doctrines, consider a
typical scenario where one business, contracting with a second business to
provide some service such as cleaning, then refuses to accept the second
61

See §§ 17(2)(b) and 18(b). For the separate interference with contract tort, the Restatement Third also defines
conduct as “wrongful” when it is to appropriate the benefits of the plaintiff’s contract or where the defendant
engaged in the conduct for the sole purpose of causing harm to the plaintiff. See § 17(2). Neither of these
additional categories of wrongfulness fit the interference with discriminatory intent application, however.
62
See § 17, cmt. e.
63
See id., § 18, cmt. b.
64
See, e.g., Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 383 (Wash. 1996) (finding a public policy in favor of
preserving life “evidenced by countless states and judicial decisions”); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975)
(state constitution, state statutes, and judicial decisions “clearly indicate” importance of jury duty). See also REL §
5.03.
65
See Restatement (Third) § 18, cmt. b.
66
See id., cmt. c.
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business’s use of an employee because of her membership in some class
protected from discrimination. Since the first “user” or client employer is at fault,
it can be held responsible through intentional interference doctrine for the
prohibited discrimination regardless of whether it had enough general control of
the second servicing business’s employees to be deemed their joint employer. By
contrast even liberal joint employment doctrine could not cover a user or client
employer that exercised no control, beyond this discriminatory action, over the
hiring, compensation, supervision, or working conditions of the second
employer’s workers.
Consider, for instance, Greene v. Harris Corporation,67 a decision upholding
dismissal of a complaint alleging that the agent of a business receiving services
from a cleaning company had caused the cleaning company’s dismissal of an
employee assigned to his office and that the agent had done so in violation of
state anti-discrimination law because of the employee’s sexual orientation. 68 The
Court of Appeals accepted these allegations, but nonetheless held that the
plaintiff could not invoke the anti-discrimination law against Harris Corporation,
the company receiving the cleaning services, because she did not allege adequate
facts to establish that the company was her joint employer.69 The dismissal seems
wrong, regardless of whether the court correctly applied joint employer doctrine;
the allegation of Harris’s agent’s discriminatory intent in causing the plaintiff’s
termination of employment should be sufficient to establish liability, whether
under an interpretation of the state law or an application of the intentional
interference tort.70
By contrast, despite its promise of strict liability without fault, courts resist
using joint employer doctrine to impose dual liability under the antidiscrimination statutes without the involvement of both employers in the
discriminatory action. Where discrimination is the fault of the agents of only one
67

653 Fed. Appx. 160 (4th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 161.
69
Id. at 164.
70
The Court of Appeals in Greene, however, upheld the lower court’s dismissal of Greene’s claim of tortious
interference with a business relationship without considering whether proof of the discriminatory intent
condemned by Maryland law should be treated as proof of improper conduct. Id. at 165.
For another revealing example of a user firm being insulated from alleged illegal discrimination because of
a finding that it was not a joint employer, see Scott v. Sarasota Doctors Hospital, Inc., 688 F. App’x 878 (11th Cir.
2017).
68
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of two joint employers, where the agents of one of the employers do not even
know of the discrimination, courts do not hold the other employer responsible. 71
For instance, in the Greene case the serviced company, even if a joint employer,
would not have been held liable for the cleaning company’s discriminatory
dismissal of an employee working at the serviced company if the agents of the
serviced company had no part in or even knowledge of the dismissal or the
discriminatory motivation.
Of course, even if joint employment doctrine does no work in the typical
contracting employer case that cannot be done alone by fault-based interference
doctrine, anti-discrimination law could be legislatively modified for it to do so. The
law could impose the strict liability promised by the joint employer doctrine on
each joint employer for discriminatory actions taken or policies set by the agents
of the other. But this use of strict liability seems politically unappealing for any
case in which the culpable agents are not acting within the scope of their
authority for both employers. Expanding joint employment to impose liability on
principles for the acts or omissions of the agents of other principals would be
foreign to the principles of agency law.72
Because economic harm is an element of the tort of intentional
interference,73 the tort may seem less applicable to discriminatory harassment of
an employee of one employer by the employees of another. Such harassment
may be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an actionable hostile work
environment under the discrimination laws,74 but if the hostility is not sufficiently
71

As stated by a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in E.E.O.C. v. Global Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 641
(9th Cir. 2019) (quoting EEOC, Notice No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to
Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms, 1997 WL 33159161, at
*11 (Dec. 3, 1997):
“As our sister circuits have explained, even if a joint-employer relationship exists, one joint employer is
not automatically liable for the actions of the other. … Liability may be imposed for a co-employer’s
discriminatory conduct only if the defendant employer knew or should have known about the other
employer’s conduct and “failed to undertake prompt corrective measures within its control.”
Accord Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 228-29 (5th Cir. 2015); Whitaker v. Milwaukee
County, 772 F.3d 802, 811-12 (7th Cir. 2014); Anderson v. Pacific Maritime Ass’n, 336 F.3d 924, 928-30 (9th Cir.
2003) (dicta); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 1988); Torres-Negron v. Merck
& Co., 488 F.3d 34, 41 n.6 (2007) (“joint-employer liability does not by itself implicate vicarious liability”).
72
See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.03 (2006) (stating ways a principal can be liable for its own agent’s
conduct).
73
See supra TAN and note 53.
74
The standard for actionable discriminatory harassment under Title VII has been consistently articulated by the
Court: “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
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severe to constitute a constructive discharge warranting the victim’s resignation,
there would be no economic harm.75 Nevertheless, as explained below,
development of fault-based tort principles also offers a more promising path to
expanded employer liability for discriminatory harassment than does the joint
employer doctrine alone.
The courts have used two doctrines to impose liability on employers for
discriminatory harassment that does not include official employer actions
resulting in tangible economic harm.76 First, for cases where the harassment has
been inflicted by supervisors with some degree of control over personnel actions
that could result in tangible economic harm, the Court, in its Faragher77 and
Ellerth78 decisions, modified imputed liability under the common law of agency to
hold liable any business for whom the inflicting supervisor is an agent, even
where the harassment is inflicted outside the agent’s scope of employment or
authority.79 The Court’s common law modification, however, also allows
employers to avoid liability for a supervisory agent’s discriminatory harassment
by proving that it acted reasonably to prevent and correct the harassment and
the victimized employee failed to act reasonably to report and mitigate it. 80
Second, the Court also has approved lower court decisions using doctrine
modeled on the tort of negligent supervision to impose direct, rather than
imputed, liability on the employer where it knew or should have known of and did
not take prompt and appropriate remedial action against discriminatory
harassment inflicted by non-supervisory co-employees.81
While an application of joint employment beyond a case of integrated
operations with joint supervisory agents would not expand employer liability
working environment.” See Oncale v. Sundowner Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 1998); Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
75
The Court’s recognition of hostile work environment harassment as actionable under Title VII turned on its
acceptance of Title VII prohibition of discrimination that did not have direct tangible economic consequences,
except presumably in cases where the harassment was sufficiently severe to justify resignation as a constructive
discharge. See Vinson, supra, at 64.
76
After the amendment of Title VII in 1991, such liability can include general compensatory damages. See 42 U.S.C.
§1981A(b).
77
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
78
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
79
Ellerth, 742 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 742 U.S. at 807.
80
Id.
81
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799-800; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
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through either of these doctrines, each could be further developed to impose
liability on employers with responsibility for harassment. First, the modified
Faragher-Ellerth agency doctrine has not been, and would not be, applied where
the harassing agent is not an agent of both employers, regardless of whether each
had sufficient potential control over the harassed employees to be treated as
their employers.82 It would be more sensible to modify agency law doctrine
further to impose liability on the principal of an harassing agent who used his or
her authority to harass an employee of another employer, regardless of whether
the harassing agent’s principal was a joint employer of the victims. Agents of
associated businesses -- especially associated dominant businesses like
franchisors or users of servicing contractors -- may have significant influence on
the continuing employment prospects of victims, even when their principals are
not joint employers. In such a case, the principal, like the harassing agent, could
be made liable for interfering with the victim’s employment relationship. 83
For instance, in a case similar to Greene, if an economically dominant user
employer’s agent uses his delegated authority to discriminatorily harass a cleaner
of his office who is employed, directed, and compensated by a cleaning company,
the agent’s employer should be subject to the Faragher-Ellerth modified agency
rule, regardless of whether the harassed cleaner is jointly employed by the
harassing agent’s employer. The most cogent deterrent rationale for the
Faragher-Ellerth modification of agency doctrine applies equally, whether or not
the victim is employed by the principle. 84
The negligent supervision model also cannot be applied against any
employer, single or joint, that did not, or at least should not, have known of the
harassment. On the other hand, the tort can readily be used to impose liability on
82

See, e.g., Takacs v. Fiore, 473 F.Supp.2d 647, 656-57 (D. Md. 2007) (even if human resources contractor was a
joint employer, the alleged harassment could not be imputed to it because the harasser was not a supervisor
within the contractor’s “hierarchy”). Cf. cases cited in note 71.
83
Many lower courts have refashioned agency doctrine to impose strict liability on principals for their agents’
abuse of delegated authority, outside the scope of their employment, in the commission of intentional torts, such
as sexual assaults, against victims subject to such abuse. In his opinion for the Court in Faragher, 524 U.S. 775, 79596 (1998), Justice Souter cited several of these cases involving police officers and therapists. For citations and
discussion, see Michael C. Harper, Fashioning a General Common Law for Employment in an Age of Statutes, 100
Cornell L. Rev. 1281, 1322-23 (2015).
84
For elaboration of this rationale, see Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment under Title VII: A
Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 41 (1999). See also J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice
Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 Va. L. Rev. 273, Part IV (1995).
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employers who knew of, but failed to take feasible effective action against the
discriminatory harassing conduct of their own employees, even where the victims
of that conduct were not also their employees.
The negligent supervision tort has been used, through the common law as
well as through state antidiscrimination law, to impose liability on employers that
negligently allow their employees to harass.85 Furthermore, the employer’s duty
to supervise runs not only to its own employees, but also to third parties such as
employees of other employers. As stated in § 7.05(1) of the Restatement Third of
Agency, “a principal who conducts an activity through an agent is subject to
liability for harm to a third party caused by the agent’s conduct if the harm was
caused by the principal’s negligence in selecting, training, retaining, supervising,
or otherwise controlling the agent.”86 Section 41 of the Restatement Third of
Torts categorizes the employer’s duty expressed in the negligent supervision tort
as an example of a duty based on a special relationship with persons “posing risk”
and states that the duty runs to third parties “when the employment facilitates
the employee’s causing harm to third parties.”87
The last condition of facilitation applies to most harassment cases with
related employers. In the typical discriminatory harassment case where joint
employment is alleged to expand employer liability, an employee of a temporary
agency or a servicing company like the cleaner in the Greene case88 is subjected to
harassment from employees of the serviced company. Whether or not the
harassers are supervisors warranting Faragher-Ellerth treatment, this harassment
is “facilitated” by the service company’s employment at its work site of the
harassers. This is true regardless of whether the victimized worker is also the
employee of the harassers’ employer. A duty should be imposed on the user or
serviced company to reasonably supervise its own employees to avoid the
discriminatory harassment of any workers at its facilities, whether or not those
workers are the user company’s employees.
85

See, e.g., Patterson v. August Wiring Systems, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 1509 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (common law claim);
Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1348 (10th Cir. 1990) (common law claim).
86
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.05(1). See also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213: “A person conducting
an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is
negligent or reckless: …. (c) in the supervision of the activity . . .”
87
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41(b)(3).
88
See supra note 67.
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To be sure, expanding the boundaries of joint employment would expand
the number of employees that an economically dominant business, like a
franchisor, had a duty to supervise, and thus would augment the impact of the
negligent supervision tort. But liability would still be based on the dominant
business’s fault. Finding economically dominant businesses to be joint employers
of harassment victims is sufficient only to impose a duty not to negligently allow
discriminatory harassment by jointly employed co-employees. Liability would still
be dependent upon proof of some failure to discharge this duty.
III.

Fault-Based Liability for Causing Another Employer’s FLSA Violation

Fault-based torts requiring some level of intent or negligence might seem
to have no potential use for the expansion of employer liability under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Employer fault is not an element of a violation of the FLSA;
unlike the anti-discrimination laws, the FLSA imposes strict liability on an
employer whenever covered employees do not receive a minimum wage 89 or an
appropriate bonus for overtime hours of work.90 If a business is an employer,
single or joint, of employees denied adequate wages, it is liable for the deficit. If it
is not such an employer, the FLSA cannot be interpreted to impose such liability,
regardless of the business’s role in causing the deficit.
Nevertheless, a strong argument can be made for the legislative or
common law development of a cause of action against businesses that
intentionally or negligently take actions that cause another business to deny its
employees the wages guaranteed by the FLSA or similar state wage and hour
laws.91 The imposition of a new duty on businesses not to cause wage and
violations by related businesses could provide another example of the special
relationships covered by § 41 of the Restatement Third of Torts noted above. 92
Section 41(a) states that “[a]n actor in a special relationship with another owes a
duty of reasonable care to third parties with regard to risks posed by the other
that arise within the scope of the relationship.”93 Expanding the list of such special
relationships to include business relationships between a dominant employer and
89

29 U.S.C. § 206.
29 U.S.C. § 207.
91
See supra note 28.
92
See supra TAN 87.
93
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 401(a).
90
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a dependent, generally subordinate employer would be preferable on policy and
more realistic on political grounds than would expanding the definition of joint
employment to encompass both employers in such a relationship. The latter
would make the dominant employer, regardless of its culpability, liable for any of
the dependent subordinate employer’s violations of the FLSA, while the former
would make the dominant employer liable only for the violations that it
intentionally or negligently caused by particular interactions with the subordinate
business.
Consider the troublesome case of Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp.94 as an
illustration. In this case a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a
grant of summary judgment in favor of the prominent fast food franchisor in a
class action brought by employees of one of its franchisees, Haynes Family LP. The
class action alleged that McDonald’s through the provision of scheduling,
timekeeping, and payment software, had caused Haynes to deny “overtime
premiums, meal and rest breaks, and other benefits in violation of the California”
wage-and-hour regulations.95 The panel accepted the plaintiffs’ proof that the
settings in the software caused many night shift-employees who worked more
than eight hours in a twenty-four hour period to not be credited with overtime in
violation of California law.96 The panel also accepted the allegation that by being
“set to daily and weekly overtime thresholds of 8:59 hours (instead of 8:00 hours)
and 50:00 hours (instead of 40:00) hours,” McDonald’s software caused many
workers to miss out on additional overtime pay.97 Finally, the panel did not
contest the plaintiffs’ allegation that because the software’s settings for meal
periods and rest periods were not compliant with California law, Haynes
employees also were denied further overtime pay.98
The panel nonetheless granted summary judgment for McDonald’s by
rejecting both the plaintiffs’ claim that McDonald’s was a joint employer of the
employees at the eight restaurants operated by Haynes 99 and also plaintiff’s claim
that McDonald’s had breached its duty to supervise Haynes reasonably to avoid
94

944 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1027. The employees brought their claim under California Wage Order No. 5-2001.
96
Id. at 1028.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
See id. at 1029-32.
95
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harm to these employees.100 The panel rejected the joint employment claim in
part because it concluded that the plaintiffs could not prove that McDonald’s had
the “right of control over factors such as hiring, direction, supervision, discipline,
discharge, and relevant day-to-day aspects of the workplace behavior” of
Haynes’s employees.”101 The panel rejected the common law fault-based claim by
holding both that McDonald’s had no relevant duty of care toward the employees
of Haynes and also that any common law action based on harm defined by the
California wage statutes would be precluded by the remedies those statutes
provided.102
The rejection of neither claim should have been surprising. The rejection of
the fault-based claim was consistent with precedent; businesses have not been
held to have a general common law duty of care toward employees of other
businesses.103 And the court’s finding that plaintiffs could not prove McDonald’s
was a joint employer was in accord with the common law not finding a business
strictly liable under respondeat superior to third parties for the torts of employees
whose work the business could not fully align with its interests.104 Thus, absent
induced reliance105 or operations with peculiar risks,106 franchisors have not been
held liable to third parties injured by the torts of the employees of independent
franchisees with economic interests in tension with those of the franchisors. 107

100

See id. at 1033.
Id. at 1032 (quoting Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, 333 P.3d 723, 739 (2014). The court relied on a California
Supreme Court decision, Martinez v. Combs, 231 P. 3d 259, 277-79 (2010) that provided three alternative
definitions for what to “employ” means under this definition. One of them was through “creating a common law
relationship” and another was “to exercise control over the wages, hours, or working conditions,” which the
Salazar court interpreted Patterson, supra, to combine, at least for franchisor cases. See 944 F.3d at 1032. Relying
on Martinez, the Salazar court found that the third alternative, “suffer or permit to work,” was not met because
Haynes had no “power” to determine whether the Haynes employees were permitted work. See 944 F.3d at 1031.
See also infra note 117.
102
Id. at 1033. The court also held that plaintiffs’ common law “ostensible agency” claim could not be advanced
under California law. Id.
103
See, e.g., Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC, 434 P. 3d 124, 139-40 (Ca. 2019) (declining to impose on payroll company
duty of care toward employees of company serviced by payroll company).
104
See, e.g., Smith v. Cities Service Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1965); Pack v. Mayor of City of N.Y., 8 N.Y. 222
(C.A. 1853); Reedie v. The London & North Western Railway Co., [1849] 4 Ex. 244, 154 E. R. 1201.
105
See, e.g., Hofherr v. Dart Industries, Inc., 853 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1988) (franchisor not liable because no evidence
of actual control over franchisee or that plaintiffs relied on franchisee being authorized to act for franchisor).
106
See, e.g., Wilson v. Good Humor Corp., 757 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (ice cream truck on busy road) (Wald, J.).
107
See, e.g., Lopez v. Motor Plan, 42 F.3d 1384 (1st Cir. 1994) (Boudin, J.).
101
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But absolving McDonald’s of responsibility for wage deprivations that it
caused seems so obviously wrong that it begs the question of whether some of
this precedent requires modification, and if so, which precedent. The most
compelling response to these questions would be a legislative or judicial provision
imposing a duty on dominant businesses like franchisors to not intentionally or
negligently cause harm – including harm defined by statutory guarantees -- to the
employees of subordinate, dependent businesses like franchisees. This duty
would not impose the strict liability that any employer, single or joint, has for any
denial of statutory guarantees. It only would require dominant businesses not to
be at fault in their affirmative exercise of any level of control they choose to
exercise in their business interests.
The Salazar case demonstrates the superiority of fault-based principles
rather than the strict liability principles embodied in joint employment through
respondeat superior. A fault-based approach would provide a beneficial incentive
for a dominant franchisor like McDonald’s to be careful before inducing a
franchisee to compensate employees in accord with faulty software that could
lead to legal harm. Finding McDonald’s business relationship with Haynes
sufficient to render McDonald’s an employer of Haynes’s employees, however,
would mean that McDonald’s could be liable for any minimum wage or overtime
deprivations suffered by these employees regardless of its involvement, through
software or more directly, or even the knowledge of McDonald’s managers. This
exposure to liability, even if insulated by indemnity clauses, could cause
McDonald’s and other franchisors to rethink a business model that has been
efficient for reasons other than the lowering of labor costs. 108 These reasons,
franchise experts suggest, include rapid expansion through dispersed
investment109 and the profit incentives offered to franchisees,110 economic
benefits that could be compromised if strict liability led franchisors to take full

108

See supra TAN and note 12.
See JEFFREY L. BRADACH, FRANCHISE ORGANIZATIONS 75 (1998); JOHN F. L OVE, MCDONALD’S: B EHIND THE ARCHES 202
(1986).
110
See James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising, 18 J. OF
FINANCIAL E CON. 401- (1987); G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts,
28 J. OF LAW AND E CON. 503 (1985).
109
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control of their franchisees’ operations. Not surprisingly, franchisors have
forcefully exerted political power against such strict liability.111
The attractiveness of a fault-based rather than strict liability approach to
dominant employer liability is demonstrated by Chief Judge Thomas’s concurring
and dissenting opinion in Salazar.112 Although Judge Thomas did not dispute the
majority opinion’s rejection of a common law negligence action and accepted its
conclusion that McDonald’s was not a common law employer of the Haynes
employees, he argued that the plaintiffs had submitted sufficient evidence to
prove to a jury that McDonald’s satisfied one of the California Supreme Court’s
alternative definitions of “to employ” under the applicable wage and hour
regulation: “to suffer or permit to work.”113 The “suffer or permit” definition was
imported from Congress’s inclusion of this phrase in the definition of “Employ” in
the FLSA.114 This inclusion was intended to ensure a dominant employer’s
responsibility for child labor within its control through encompassing a broader
scope of relationships than does the common law test of employment. 115 In the
decades since the passage of the FLSA, federal courts have responded with
somewhat variant multifactor tests for both single and joint employment, which
may or not be broader than the multifactor tests used to define the common
law.116 In Salazar, however, Judge Thomas’s rejection of a finding of summary
judgment based on the “suffer and permit” definition does not rely on any
multifactor test that would make McDonald’s strictly liable as a joint employer of
the Haynes employees.117 Rather, he stresses that the plaintiffs presented
evidence that McDonald’s “computer system … was a direct cause of their lost
111

See supra notes 14-15.
See 344 F.3d at 1034.
113
See id. at 1034-35.
114
29 U.S.C. § 203(g). See supra note 5.
115
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992).
116
See REL § 1.01, cmts. d-e and cases cited therein. For examples of FLSA multifactor tests for joint employment,
see, e.g., Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Company Inc., 355 F.3d 6 (2d. Cir. 2005); Torres-Lopez v. May, 111F.3d 633, 640
(9th Cir. 1997).
117
Nor does he rely on the interpretation of the California law’s “suffer or permit to work” definition of employ
given by the California Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 5th
903 (2018) . This interpretation, now codified through CA AB5(19R), conditions a hiring entity’s treatment of a
worker as an independent contractor on the entity proving the worker: (a) is free from the control and direction of
the hiring entity; (b) performs work outside the usual course of hiring entity’s business; and (c) is customarily
engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business. Id. at 964. The Salazar court found the
Dynamex test only to concern whether workers are employees, not define what businesses are employers. See 944
F.3d at 1032. There was no dispute in Salazar that the hiring party was Haynes, not McDonald’s.
112
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wages,”118 and that McDonald’s “was aware that work was occurring under
unlawful conditions.”119 Judge Thomas thus concludes “that McDonald’s had the
ability to prevent wage-and-hour violations caused by its … system settings yet
failed to do so.”120 For Judge Thomas, McDonald’s liability could and should turn
on its culpability for suffering and permitting the violations; he did not and
presumably could not cite evidence that McDonald’s had any control over the
hiring of the Haynes workers or otherwise suffered and permitted their
employment as would a joint employer subject to strict liability without
culpability.
The potential of fault-based analysis for the expansion of liability under
wage and hour laws does not mean that economically dominant businesses,
including franchisors, never have sufficient control over economically dependent,
subordinate businesses to qualify as joint employers even under the common law
standard for strict vicarious liability. As I have noted in other writing, 121 some
franchises are sham arrangements that hide single employment relationships with
franchisee-employees.122 Furthermore, even where franchise agreements, like
those prevalent in the fast food industry, divide franchisee interests from those of
their franchisors by requiring payments as a percentage of revenues rather than
profits,123 a dominant franchisor might assert sufficient control, including through
mandatory software, to ensure that the franchisee employees work fully in the
franchisor’s interest.124 But the case for expanding the liability of dominant
businesses like franchisors is stronger under doctrine that requires proof of some
level of fault rather than one that imposes strict liability because of the
subordinate business’s economic dependence or the dominate business’s
potential economic leverage.
Fault and culpability admittedly are relative concepts that require some
presumed level of responsibility or duty to be meaningfully applied. Any cause of
118

944 F.3d at 1035.
Id.
120
Id.
121
See Michael C. Harper, Using the Anglo-American Respondeat Superior Principle to Assign Responsibility for
Worker Statutory Benefits and Protections, Wash. Univ. Global Stud. L, Rev. 161, 205 (2019).
122
See, e.g., Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D. Mass. 2010) (cleaning company
denominated its cleaning workers as franchisees; misclassification under Massachusetts law).
123
See supra TAN and note 10.
124
See Harper, supra note 121, at 206-207.
119
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action against a dominant but non-employer business based on the business’s
fault, including one based on § 41 of the Restatement Third of Torts, thus must
define the level of care that a business with economic leverage must exercise to
protect the statutory rights of the employees of other businesses. If the law
imposes a duty on economically dominant businesses to monitor and avoid any
and all risks that a subordinate business might abridge statutory wage guarantees
of its employees, the effects on independently efficient business relationships
could be close to those of the strict liability imposed by joint employer
obligations. Imposing on dominant businesses a duty of care over the labor
policies of dependent, subordinate businesses could require a restructuring of
their business relationships.
The fault-based cause of action thus could instead impose a responsibility
to take reasonable care only in taking affirmative actions -- such as McDonald’s
provision of flawed software -- that could result in harm defined by wage and
hour statutes. Such affirmative actions, for instance, could include using economic
leverage to impose cost-plus contracts on associated businesses that provide for
wages that do not comply with the associated businesses statutory obligations to
their employees. Such contracts presumably would both directly cause such noncompliance and communicate its inevitability to agents of the dominant
businesses. These kinds of cost-plus contracts also are distinguishable from
business relationships resulting in thin profit margins for the subordinate
business. Since any subordinate business presumably wants to structure labor
costs to maximize its profits, a causal connection between an unfavorable
business relationship and wage and hour violations cannot be assumed.
A perhaps more inclusive line also might be drawn by imposing a
responsibility based on a dominant business’s chosen level of monitoring of
subordinate businesses. This would impose responsibility for business practices of
which the dominant was actually aware125 without also requiring additional
monitoring and possible inefficient business integration because of a judgment
that a dominant business could and thus should have been aware of wage and
hour violations of a subordinate business. For instance, if a fast food franchisor
used monitoring software that provided it with proof that a franchisee was
125

These were the allegations against the Domino’s Pizza franchisor deemed sufficient to survive judgment on the
pleadings in Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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committing violations, the franchisor could be held responsible, without also
imposing comparable monitoring responsibilities on other franchisors only
because they had the economic leverage to insist upon such monitoring. 126

IV.

Fault-Based Expansion of Liability Under the NLRA

Unlike the FLSA, the National Labor Relations Act does not make employers
strictly liable for their employees not receiving some guaranteed benefit or
protection. Instead, like the anti-discrimination laws, the NLRA prohibits as unfair
labor practices only employer actions taken with culpable intent or at least
without adequate business justification to outweigh particular effects.127 Section
8(a) of the NLRA in particular defines as prohibited employer unfair labor
practices: “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights”128 to engage or refrain from engaging in “concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”129 and “(3) by
discrimination in regard to tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.”130
The NLRA, however, does not mirror the common law by providing a
private right of action against culpable employer action, even --- like the antidiscrimination laws -- after the exhaustion of administrative remedies; employees
only can file against employers charges that may or may not result in complaints
pressed through Labor Board processes by the General Counsel and his or her
126

Brishen Rogers, arguing for a fault-based expansion to dominant firms of liability for wage and hour violations in
supply chains, would define the duty of such firms more broadly. He would impose a duty of reasonable care on
such firms to take affirmative steps to prevent foreseeable violations by domestic low wage firms in supply chains,
whether or not the dominant firms are even in direct contractual privity with the firms that are at risk for
violations. See Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 33, 4647 (2011). If politically feasible, the imposition of such a broad duty could be an effective way to ensure a
compensatory remedy for wage and hour violations by low capitalized, potentially insolvent businesses in
particular supply chains. But if applied broadly in all industries, including to franchising operations where the risk
of insolvency is slight, it could also result in forcing inefficient vertical reintegration.
127
See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954)
(both holding that employer can be found guilty of unfair labor practices in some cases even without proof of
improper motive).
128
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
129
29 U.S.C. § 157.
130
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
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staff.131 Furthermore, the NLRA has been interpreted to carry a strong preemptive
force against any common law action that would provide additional remedies
against that which is prohibited by the Act132 or that would upset the balance in
labor relations set by the Act.133 Thus, absent some significant legislative
reordering of American labor law, any imposition of responsibility on a business
for unfair labor practices taken against employees of another employer would
have to be based upon the interpretation of the current law.
Significantly, in a revealing set of older cases, the Labor Board has made
such an interpretation. The decisions extend back to 1952 when the Board held
that a general contractor on a construction site, Austin, violated § 8(a)(3) by
insisting, in response to union pressure, that a security guard subcontractor
remove three of its employees from the site because they belonged to the wrong
union local.134 The Board acknowledged that the contractor was not an employer
of the removed guards, as there was no “evidence that Austin exercised any
control over the guards, who were assigned, directed, and paid entirely by
Pinkerton,”135 the security guard subcontractor. But the Board held that an
employment relationship between the general contractor and the aggrieved
employees was not necessary for the general contractor’s coverage.136 As the
Board explained, “[i]t is evident, as the Trial Examiner found, and as the General
Counsel concedes, that these guards were not employees of Austin. However,
Austin’s defense, grounded on this fact alone, finds no statutory support. Rather,
the statute, read literally, precludes any employer from discriminating with
respect to any employee, for Section 8 (a) (3) does not limit its prohibitions to acts
of an employer vis-à-vis his own employees. Significantly, other sections of the
Act do limit their coverage to employees of a particular employer. Thus, Section 8
(a) (5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer ““to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representative of his employees …” and Section 8 (b) (4) (B)
prohibits a labor organization from striking to force or require any other employer
131

See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep’t of Industry v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986) (state cannot add penalties for unfair
labor practices to those set by Congress in NLRA).
133
See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 354 U.S. 60 (2008); Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
134
Austin Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1257 (1952).
135
Id. at 1258.
136
Id.
132
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to recognize the labor organization “as the representative of his employees …”
[emphasis supplied]. Thus, the omission of qualifying language in Section 8 (a) (3)
cannot be called accidental. Moreover, Section 2 (3), in defining the term
“employee,” provides that the term “… shall not be limited to the employees of a
particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise …” The statutory
language therefore clearly manifests a congressional intent not to delimit the
scope of Section 8 (a) (3) in the manner urged here by Respondent Austin.” 137
The Board applied the same analysis in later cases, finding violations of
both §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) in the absence of an employment relationship
between the culpable employer and the aggrieved employees. 138 In some of these
cases the Board found liable an economically dominant contractor that forced an
independent, but subordinate subcontractor to not employ workers due to their
union-related activity.139 In other cases the Board found liable businesses with
dominance over a subsidiary140 or over a staffing agency.141 In each case the
dominant business was held liable because it intentionally caused the denial of
the statutory rights of the subordinate business’s employees, not because it was
found to be a joint employer that could have been liable for any statutory
violation committed by the subordinate.142
The doctrine set in those decisions, rather than joint employer doctrine, 143
is the doctrine that progressive lawyers should seek to develop to impose liability
137

138

Id. at 1258-59.

As stated by the Republican-majority Board in International Shipping Ass’n, 297 N.L.R.B. 1059, 1059
(1990): “Respondent Lederle contends that because it is not the employer of the discriminatees it cannot
be found to have violated Section 8(a). This contention is without merit. The Board consistently
has held that an employer under Section 2(3) of the Act may violate Section 8(a) not only with
respect to its own employees but also by actions affecting employees who do not stand in such
an immediate employer/employee relationship. See, e.g., Jimmy Kilgore Trucking, 254 NLRB 935,
946-947 (1981); Lucky Stores, 243 NLRB 642, 643 (1979); Dews Construction, 231 NLRB 182 fn. 4
(1977), enfd. 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978); and Fabric Services, 190 NLRB 540 (1971). See also NeoLife Co. of America, 273 NLRB 72, 77 (1984); and Georgia Pacific Corp., 221 NLRB 982, 986 (1975).”
139

See Dews Constr. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 182 (1977); Georgia-Pacific Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. 982 (1975).
See Esmark, Inc. 315 N.L.R.B. 763 (1994).
141
See International Shipping Ass’n, supra note 138.
142
For an excellent treatment of these cases, see Caroline B. Galiatsos, Beyond Joint Employer Status: A New
Analysis for Employers’ Unfair Labor Practice Liability Under the NLRA, 95 B. U. L. Rev. 2083, 2106-2108 (2015).
143
The Board’s recognition that an employer, absent joint employment status, may commit unfair labor practices
against employees of other employers also is reflected in its formulation of doctrine governing the access of
employees of subcontractors or tenants to solicit on an employer’s property. See Bexar County Performing Arts
140
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on dominant businesses that cause employees of subordinate, dependent
businesses to suffer unfair labor practices. That development, for instance, could
abrogate the Board’s current curious interpretation of §8(a)(3) not to prohibit an
employer’s “ceasing to do business with another employer because of the union
or nonunion activity of the latter’s employees.”144 A Democratic-majority Board
first pronounced this interpretation in a questionable 1968 decision in which a
union pressured a contractor through reserve gate picketing not treated as
secondary and illegal.145 But the interpretation has been affirmed without any
persuasive justification in cases where dominant businesses terminate contracts
with subordinate employers because of union activity among the subordinate’s
employees.146 By allowing dominant businesses intentionally to eliminate union
subordinates, the interpretation does more to weaken the force of §§ 8(a)(3) and
(a)(1) in the current fissured economy than does any strict interpretation of joint
employment. As highlighted by the Austin line of cases discussed above, it cannot
be reconciled with the statute’s language and purpose, and should be
overturned.147
The doctrine set in the Austin line of cases also would have been a more
effective and promising tool than was joint employment for the General Counsel
to have used in the complaints brought against McDonald’s in December, 2014. 148
Those complaints charged McDonald’s with liability for unfair labor practices
suffered by employees of some of its franchisees because of work actions taken
by the employees in support of a campaign to raise wages.149 The General Counsel
Center Foundation, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 46 (2019) (non-joint employer property owners may not exclude off-duty
employees of an on-site contractor if: (1) the employees work regularly and exclusively on the property; and (2)
the property owner fails to show that they have one or more reasonable alternatives to communicate their
message); New York New York Hotel & Casino, 356 N.L.R.B. 907 (2011), enf’d, 676 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(doctrine modified in Bexar).
144
Malbaff, 172 N.L.R.B. 128, 129 (1968).
145
See id.
146
See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 285 (1997). In this decision, the unanimous Board panel, including
Chairman Gould and Members Fox and Higgins, expressly rejected the Administrative Law Judge’s use of the Austin
line of cases, apparently blithely accepting the weapon against unions and the nondiscriminatory principles of the
Act they were affording employers. Such acceptance was not necessary even without overruling Malbaff, which
involved common situs secondary picketing more particularly regulated through § 8(b)(4) doctrine. At least one
former Board Member recognized in an opinion that Malbaff should and could be over turned. See Airborne
Express, 33 N.L.R.B. 597, 598 n.1 (2002) (Member Liebman, concurring). See also Becker, infra note 147.
147
See Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1527, 1550-51 (1996); Michael C.
Harper, Defining the Economic Relationship Appropriate for Collective Bargaining, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 329, 346 (1998).
148
See McDonald’s USA, LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (2019).
149
Id., slip op. at 1.
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proceeded in the McDonald’s case by introducing evidence to demonstrate that
McDonald’s was a joint employer of the franchisees’ employees and therefore
strictly liable for any unfair labor practices committed by the franchisees against
their employees. This evidence consisted not only of McDonald’s nationwide
business policies, and practices, but also of McDonald’s direction of a nationwide
effort to coordinate the response of the franchisees to protected concerted and
union activities in support of the wage campaign.150 Had the General Counsel
used the Austin line of cases instead of joint employment to establish McDonald’s
liability for any unfair labor practices committed against franchisee employees
during the campaign, the latter evidence could have been sufficient. The General
Counsel could have proven McDonald’s culpability for any franchisee unfair labor
practices without sustaining the much more difficult proof of McDonald’s being a
joint employer.
Proving that a dominant business, such as a franchisor like McDonald’s, is a
joint employer inevitably will be more difficult than proving its culpability for
causing particular unfair labor practices. Regardless of how broadly joint
employment is defined, proof of joint employment status will require a
demonstration not of causation of particular employment decisions, but rather of
the dominant employer’s general control over the employees of the economically
subordinate employer. It is this case of general control that the General Counsel
in the McDonald’s litigation struggled to make, whether or not successfully.
Furthermore, expansion of joint employment beyond the perimeters set by
its origins in respondeat superior is likely to make less tenable the assumption of
strict liability for joint employers that have no involvement in unfair labor
practices committed by the other employer. Indeed, the Board in a 1993 decision,
Capital EMI Music, Inc., 151 held that a temporary employment agency, though a
joint employer of the workers it supplied to a record distributor, was not liable for
the distributor’s discharge of one of the supplied workers because of the worker’s
union activity. The Board held the employment agency was not liable because it
demonstrated that it did not know nor had any reason to know of the
distributor’s antiunion reason for the discharge. Although the Board has not
applied Capital EMI to shield nonculpable joint employers other than staffing
150
151

Id., slip op at 13 (Member McFerran, dissenting)
311 N.L.R.B. 997 (1993), enf’d, 23 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1994).
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agencies, strong arguments would be made to do so were economically dominant
businesses with no direct control of a subordinate business’s managerial agents
treated as joint employers of subordinate businesses’ employees. It seems
doubtful, for instance, that most courts would find it acceptable to impose
liability on a franchisor for one of its franchisee’s discharge of an employee when
the franchisee’s discriminatory motive was not known and the franchisor would
not be liable under traditional respondeat superior analysis for torts against third
parties. If accepted, such expanded strict liability, like an expansion of strict
liability under the anti-discrimination laws or the FLSA, would provide incentives
for otherwise inefficient vertical integration.152
The Capital EMI decision also suggests how the fault-based doctrine in the
Austin line of cases might be developed somewhat further to impose liability
without regard to joint employment status on economically dominant employers
for unfair labor practices committed by subordinate employers. In dicta the
Capital EMI Board stated that a joint employer who knew of the other employer’s
unfair labor practice still could escape liability by demonstrating that “it took all
measures within its power to resist the action.”153 This suggests how the Board
might go beyond the Austin line of cases to impose liability on any dominant
employer, whether or not a joint employer, when it knew of a subordinate’s
unfair labor practices, but took no reasonable steps to prevent them. The Board,
in other words, stopping short of the strict liability imposed by respondeat
superior, could impose a duty on employers to not acquiesce in the commission of
unfair labor practices over other employers that it controlled. 154 Rather than
encouraging a departure from an otherwise efficient level of vertical integration,
such a duty still would accept the level of vertical integration between businesses
that had been determined to be otherwise efficient.
To be sure, the NLRA does more than prohibit employers, and labor
organizations,155 from discriminating against or coercing or restraining employees
in the exercise of their rights to engage in or refrain from union-related or other
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. 156 The Act also requires any
152

See supra TAN 108.
Id. at 1000.
154
For a well framed proposal for the formulation of such doctrine, see Galiatsos , supra note 142, at 2108-2115.
155
29 U.S.C. §§ 148(b)(1)(a); (b)(2).
156
29 U.S.C. § 147.
153
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covered employer to bargain collectively with a union representative selected by
a majority of “his” employees157 in a unit appropriate for bargaining.158 One might
infer that that the General Counsel in 2014 pressed the sixty-one § 8(a)(1)
interference and § 8(a)(3) discrimination complaints against McDonald’s under a
joint employer theory, rather than an easier to substantiate culpable nonemployer theory, because the General Counsel’s ultimate goal was to establish
McDonald’s duty to bargain with any union that achieved the support of a
majority of employees at any franchisee location.159 Bargaining an agreement
with McDonald’s at a few locations presumably would have facilitated achieving
employee support at all other franchisee locations. It is revealing that Member
McFerran’s dissent from the Trump-appointed General Counsel’s settlement of
the McDonald’s complaints expressed her concern that the General Counsel did
not adequately account for the “important collateral consequences for
McDonald’s, in both unfair labor practice proceedings involving its franchisees
and in possible representation cases, if workers employed at McDonald’s
franchisees sought to organize.”160 It is also revealing that the Browning Ferris
case161 in which the Obama-appointed Board formulated doctrine governing joint
employment was prompted by a union petition to represent employees in
bargaining with both an economically dominant business and a subordinate labor
supplier as joint employers of workers hired and supplied by the subordinate.
That collective bargaining advocates would want to impose on businesses
collective bargaining obligations toward workers for whose torts they would not
be strictly liable as an employer through respondeat superior is understandable.162
It makes little sense to use the respondeat superior analysis that defines employer
liability for wrongs of subordinates to define the businesses that should be
required to bargain over benefits and working conditions with workers. As I have

157

29 U.S.C. § 148(a)(5).
29 U.S.C. § 149(a).
159
The general organization of workers at McDonald’s outlets must have been the ultimate goal of the Service
Employees International Union’s campaign to raise wages at these outlets, including the associated work actions
that prompted the responses that were the subject of the General Counsel’s complaint.
160
McDonald’s USA, LCC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (2019), slip op. at 13 (emphasis supplied).
161
362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015), remanded 911 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
162
Whether it was appropriate for the General Counsel to use §§ 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) complaints to establish join
employment for purposes of collective bargaining and union organization is a different question beyond the scope
of this article.
158
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argued elsewhere,163 whether a non-culpable business should be strictly liable for
discrimination of or the denial of benefits to workers can be sensibly answered by
asking whether it should be strictly liable for torts committed by those workers
against third parties. But given the redistributive goals of the NLRA,164 different
considerations should determine whether a business’s management, as a
representative of the suppliers of capital, should have to submit to good faith
bargaining with a union representative of the laborers who help make that capital
productive. As I also have argued elsewhere,165 those different considerations
should include identification of the suppliers of the capital – including perhaps the
intellectual property of brands –that the workers make productive. For collective
bargaining to provide any leverage to workers to extract a greater share of the
profits that their labor helped engender, they must be able to bargain with firms
that have garnered most of those profits. As the vertical disintegration of
production, distribution, and servicing has proceeded in our advanced capitalist
economy, it has become more and more likely that those firms are those with
some degree of oligopolistic power or brand differentiation in their market. 166
These firms, the ones with above market profits or “rents” that could be shared
with labor, are not necessarily those with any formal or immediate control over
the wages and terms and conditions of employment that are subject to
mandatory bargaining with labor.167
For instance, requiring McDonald’s to bargain with a union representative
over the wages and working conditions of its franchisees’ employees would
enable the employees to have a better opportunity to capture more of the
returns from the sale of what a combination of their labor with McDonald’s
163

See Harper, supra note 121, at 177-184.
See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (concern with “inequality of bargaining power . . . depressing wage rates and the purchasing
power of wage earners”).
165
See Michael C. Harper, Defining the Economic Relationship Appropriate for Collective Bargaining, 39 B. C. L. Rev.
329, 344-356 (1998).
166
For empirical support, see, e.g., Richard A. Benton & Ki-Jung Kim, The Dependency Structure of Bad Jobs: How
Market Constraints Undermine Job Quality, ILR Review (July 5, 2020); Anna Stansbury & Lawrence Summers,
Declining Worker Power and American Economic Performance, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (March 29,
2020). The latter paper provides a compelling statistical case for using the decline in worker bargaining power,
rather than increases in product market monopolies and labor market monopsonies, to explain the rising share of
above competitive market profits (“rents”) being captured as profits for shareholders rather than shared with
workers. Id. The decline in worker bargaining power of course reflects the decline in union density over the past
half century. Id.
167
29 U.S.C. § 148(d).
164
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capital, including its brand, can garner. Such a bargaining obligation between the
employees of franchisees who use a brand and the franchisor company that
profits from the brand’s product differentiation should exist regardless of the
franchisor’s level of control over the identity or work of the franchisees’
employees.168 Furthermore, unlike making McDonald’s liable for the derelictions
of its franchisees’ agents and employees, requiring McDonald’s to bargain about
the division of the returns from the sales of its branded products with the
employees of the franchisees that contribute to these sales would not impel
McDonald’s to reconsider otherwise efficient divisions of authority with the
franchisees. Any franchising that exists only to avoid collective bargaining and a
shift in the divisions of returns between capital and labor cannot be defended on
the grounds of efficiency.
But the battle over defining the economic relationship appropriate for
collective bargaining needs to be fought on a different field as part of the reform
of the NLRA, rather than indirectly through the development of joint employer
doctrine that would be inadequate for both defining collective bargaining and for
governing secondary responsibility for discrimination or the denial of minimum
benefits. That field has to be one of legislation that can address the
incompatibility of the common law definition of the employment relationship
with the purposes of the NLRA.169 The Taft-Hartley Congress’ clearly expressed
intent to use the common law to define the employment relationship170 and
hence any bargaining obligation between an employer and “his” employees
prevents a broadening of bargaining obligations under the current statute.

168

This is not to argue that the employees of McDonald’s franchisees, any more than McDonald’s own employees,
should be able to insist on bargaining about McDonald’s branding decisions and control. The NLRA sensibly does
not require bargaining over how a business extracts profits from its product market; it simply requires bargaining
over how those profits are divided between the providers of the capital and the providers of the labor that are
combined to create that product. See Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National
Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1447 (1982). For similar reasons, McDonald’s
should be able to protect its brand without becoming a joint employer that is liable for all its franchisees’ common
law and statutory torts. Defining McDonald’s responsibilities to bargain over the distribution of the rents garnered
from its brand presents a totally different question, however.
169
I suggested what might be the outlines of such legislation in Harper, supra note 147, at 44-56. I intend to
explore more fully in a future essay how labor law reform legislation should define bargaining responsibilities.
170
See H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 3020, at 18 (1947).
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V.

Conclusion

As explained above, the definition of joint employment is the wrong terrain
on which to advance employment and labor law reform. The focus on joint
employment diverts attention from the use and development of existing doctrine
that can better ensure the liability of solvent businesses for deprivations of
employment rights that they cause. The concept of joint employment also
provides the wrong goal for redefining bargaining responsibilities in the
comprehensive labor law reform necessary for the rejuvenation of the American
labor movement. Progressive lawyers need to think more deeply and creatively
about defining both the bounds of employer liability and the obligations to
bargain with union-represented employees.
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